Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind
Brian McLaughlin (Rutgers) and Jonathan Cohen(UC,
San Diego), editors
Table of Contents
Notes on Contributors
1 Mental Content
Is there a viable notion of narrow mental content?
Is externalism about mental content compatible with privileged
1. Cognitive Content and Propositional Attitude Attributions
2. There is No Viable Notion of Narrow Content
3. Externalism and Privileged Access are Consistent
4. Externalism and Privileged Access are Inconsistent
Is the intentional essentially normative?
Is there is non-conceptual content?
5. Psychology Isn't Normative
6. Normativism Defended
- Yes, but...:
7. Revenge of the Given
- Yes, and...:
8. Are There Different Kinds of Content?
Is non-reductive materialism viable?
9. Everybody Has Got It: A Defense of Non-Reductive Materialism
10. The Evolving Fortunes of Eliminative Materialism
Should physicalists be a priori physicalists?
Is there an unresolved problem of mental causation?
11. A Priori Physicalism
12. On the Limits of A Priori Physicalism
13. Causation and Mental Causation
14. Mental Causation, Or Something Near Enough
3 The Place of Consciousness in Nature
Is consciousness ontologically emergent from the physical?
Are phenomenal characters and intentional contents of experiences
15. Dualist Emergentism
16. Against Ontologically Emergent Consciousness
Is awareness of our mental acts a kind of perceptual consciousness?
17. New Troubles for the Qualia Freak
18. A Case for Qualia
19. All Consciousness is Perceptual
20. Mental Action and Self-Awareness (I)