Photographs Are Not Transparent1
Jonathan Cohen2 and Aaron Meskin3
The photograph is the only picture that can truly
convey information, even if it is technically faulty and the object
can barely be identified.
A painting of a murder is of no interest whatever; but a photograph of
a murder fascinates everyone.
- Gerhard Richter, quoted in [Obrist, 1995], 56-57.
Abstract:
In [Walton, 1984], Kendall Walton offers a startling explanation of
the widely voiced, but poorly understood, claim that photographs are
epistemically special.
Namely, he claims, photographs are "transparent" - that is,
unlike other depictive representations, they enable us literally to
see their depicta.
While many share the intuition that Walton's proposal is enlisted to
explicate, his thesis that photographs are transparent has not
convinced many.
On the other hand, it has proven surprisingly difficult to say just
what is wrong about the transparency thesis.
In this paper we answer this challenge and explain why photographs are
not transparent.
In [Walton, 1984], Kendall Walton offers a startling explanation of
the widely voiced, but poorly understood, claim that photographs give
us a firmer epistemic connection to the world than do other depictive
representations.
He suggests that photographs are special because they are
"transparent" - that is, they are special because, unlike other
depictive representations, they enable us literally to see their
depicta.4
While many share the intuition that Walton's proposal is enlisted to
explicate - consider, for example, Bazin's famous claim that "The
objective nature of photography confers on it a quality of credibility
absent from all other picture-making" ([Bazin, 1967], 14) -
his thesis that photographs are transparent has not convinced many.
On the other hand, it has proven surprisingly difficult to say just
what is wrong about the transparency thesis.
In this paper we answer this challenge and explain why photographs are
not transparent.
1 Transparency and Photographs
In saying that photographs are transparent, Walton means that visually
attending to a photograph enables us to see something numerically
distinct from that photograph - viz., its depictum.5
For Walton, photographs are of a kind with mirrors, telescopes, and
microscopes: they are prosthetic devices that enable us to see things
that we could not see without them (cf. [Lewis, 1980]).
Whereas these other prostheses help us to see things around corners,
very distant things, and very small things, photographs enable us to
see things that are spatio-temporally remote.6
Walton emphasizes that he means this proposal quite literally:
I must warn against watering down this suggestion, against taking it
to be a colorful, or exaggerated, or not quite literal way of making a
relatively mundane point.
I am not saying that the person looking at the dusty photographs has
the impression of seeing his ancestors - in fact, he doesn't
have the impression of seeing them "in the flesh," with the unaided
eye.
I am not saying that photography supplements vision by helping
us to discover things we can't discover by seeing....
Nor is my point that what we see - photographs - are
duplicates or doubles or reproductions of objects,
or substitutes or surrogates for them.
My claim is that we see, quite literally, our dead relatives
themselves when we look at photographs of them ([Walton, 1984],
251-252, emphasis in original).
Why does Walton insist that photographs are transparent?
He believes that there are significant similarities between the way
that photographs provide visual experiences and the way that ordinary
vision provides visual experiences.
For one, photographic images are counterfactually dependent on the
scenes they represent; for example, had your ancestor been smiling
rather than frowning, the photograph of her would have looked
different.
For another, and unlike realistic paintings and drawings (where such
counterfactual dependency may hold), this counterfactual dependence is
not mediated by the intentional states of any intermediary agents.
As Gregory Currie puts it, there is a "natural dependence" of
photographs on the scenes that they depict ([Currie, 1995], 55).
Finally, photographs also preserve real similarity relations between
objects: like ordinary perception, confusions about photographic
representations (i.e., with respect to what they depict) tend to be
linked to real similarities between objects.
For Walton, then, photographs are transparent but paintings are not.
Moreover, he argues, this difference makes an epistemic difference -
for example, it explains why the appearance of photographs but not
that of paintings supports counterfactuals about the appearance of the
depictum.
In addition, it explains why we often treat photographs as evidence
(both formal and informal), whereas we are resistant to treating
paintings and drawings as such.
We believe that Walton's proposal does highlight certain important
features of photographs that are worth capturing.
However, it has the significant defect that its core thesis - that
of the transparency of photographs - is (to put it gently) highly
counterintuitive.7
But just what is wrong with this thesis?
In particular, if we are to deny the thesis, we owe an explanation of
what it is about photographs that makes them non-transparent, given
that there are other visual prostheses, such as mirrors and
telescopes, which are transparent.
This, then, is Walton's challenge to those who reject the transparency
thesis: explain the relevant difference between photographs, on the
one hand, and mirrors and telescopes, on the other.
2 Egocentric Spatial Information
To motivate our own answer to Walton's challenge, it will be useful to
begin with a proposal that has been suggested by a number of
authors (cf. [Carroll, 1995], [Carroll, 1996] (62-63),
[Currie, 1991], [Currie, 1995], [Warburton, 1988]), and that
turns on an appeal to visually represented spatial information.
The idea here is that a necessary requirement for x's seeing y is
that x represents information about the spatial relations between
x and y.8
This requirement, it has been suggested, effectively draws a line in
the sand between uncontroversial examples of transparent visual
prostheses on the one hand, and photographs on the other.
Currie and Carroll state the view explicitly:9
With ordinary seeing, we get information about the spatial and
temporal relations between the object seen and ourselves ....
Photographs on the other hand do not convey egocentric information;
seeing a photograph does not tell me anything much about where the
object photographed is in relation to me ([Currie, 1995], 66).
I submit that we do not speak literally of seeing objects unless I can
perspicuously relate myself spatially to them - i.e., unless I know
(roughly) where they are in the space I inhabit ([Carroll, 1996],
62).
The most obvious way of understanding this proposal is as adding a
doxastic requirement (a requirement about what the agent believes or
knows) to the conditions that an agent must satisfy if she is to count
as seeing an object.
Understood in this way, the proposal is that seeing requires the
formation of certain beliefs or judgments.
For example, Currie specifically refers to the "kinds of judgments
we make in cases of ordinary seeing ... which have no counterparts
in the case of seeing photographs" ([Currie, 1995], 66).
Similarly, Carroll speaks of ordinary seeing as requiring knowledge
about spatial relations.
Walton has argued in [Walton, 1997] that no proposal of this sort
can be successful because the requirement it places on seeing is too
strong.
To make this point, Walton imagines two cases in which a viewer sees a
carnation without meeting the doxastic requirement about spatial
information set out above.
In the first, a viewer receives visual information about a carnation
through a long series of mirrors; the viewer knows neither how many
mirrors are involved nor how they are oriented, so he has no idea what
direction the carnation is from him (70).
Walton claims that this viewer will lack information about the
location of the carnation in egocentric space; but since all parties
to the discussion concede that mirrors are transparent, he thinks, the
viewer should count as (prosthetically) seeing the carnation.
In the second case, the carnation is indeed right in front of me, but
there are many mirrors around, or I suspect that there are.
Here, too, Walton claims that I lack the relevant egocentric
spatial information about the carnation: "I think I may
be seeing the image of a carnation reflected in one or many mirrors,
So I have no idea where the carnation is in relation to me" (70).
Since he thinks that in both cases the viewer sees the carnation, even
though she lacks the egocentric information about its location, Walton
concludes that possession of that information about the carnation is
not necessary for seeing it.10
While these cases pose serious problems for Currie and Carroll, we do
not believe that they settle the issue against the doxastic proposal
by themselves.
For one thing, although Currie is comfortable denying that seeing
takes place in the sequence of mirrors case ([Currie, 1995], 70) -
and would seem forced to take the same position about Walton's second
case - an alternative answer would be to weaken the doxastic
requirement so as to evade the case.
For example, one might hold that seeing requires not (as before)
holding a belief about the egocentric location of the object, but
merely the belief that the object is in the same general space as
oneself.
On a weakened doxastic theory of this sort, it is plausible that the
agent in both of Walton's cases manages to see, since, plausibly, such
very minimal belief is present in these cases.
Unfortunately, we anticipate that the debate would become stymied if
carried on in this fashion: Walton would respond with further
counterexamples to the weakened doxastic requirement, which could then
be used to motivate still weaker versions of the doxastic requirement,
at which point Walton would concoct yet stranger counterexamples, and
so on.
We believe that a cycle of counterexamples and responses of this
kind is unlikely to convince anyone of anything.
However, we propose to sidestep these difficulties: as we shall argue
below, there are independent (and, we believe, more compelling) reasons
for doubting that any doxastic solution can succeed.
It is to these reasons that we now turn.
3 Toward a Non-Doxastic Solution
We are convinced that the contemplated requirement on seeing proposed
by Currie and Carroll is too strong.
However, we believe that a proper appreciation of the reasons for the
failure of this requirement points the way toward a more successful
answer to Walton's challenge.
Rather than weakening the doxastic requirement, we propose to drop it
all together, while retaining Currie's and Carroll's insight that
spatial information is the key to resisting Walton's transparency
thesis.
The requirement at issue (on the doxastic reading considered so far)
concerns what subjects must believe in order to count as seeing an
object.
Walton's cases are designed to bring out the failure of such a
doxastic requirement on object seeing by pointing out that beliefs can
be undermined too easily - viz., beliefs can be undermined in ways
that do not undermine seeing.
For example, virtually any of my beliefs can be undermined by the
onset of a sufficiently far-reaching skepticism.
But, while it is plausible that the onset of skeptical doubt might
erode a subject's belief that she sees a carnation (or belief
that she is within four feet of a carnation, or even the belief that
she is somewhere near a carnation), presumably we do not want to say
that it would (by itself) prevent her from seeing a carnation
that is right in front of her face.
This is why we are inclined to say of Walton's second case, wherein
the subject merely doubts that she lacks egocentric information, that
the subject nonetheless sees the carnation.
Similarly, the onset of confusion may undermine a subject's
belief that she sees (or any of her other beliefs, for that
matter), but it is implausible that such confusion should (by itself)
vitiate her capacity to see.
This is why we are inclined to say of Walton's first case, wherein the
intervention of a series of mirrors at unknown angles makes the
subject confused about the egocentric location of the carnation, that
the subject continues to see the carnation.11
These reflections suggest to us that no doxastic condition on object
seeing will suffice to distinguish prosthetic seeing through mirrors
from (putative) prosthetic seeing through photographs.
That is, it cannot involve the requirement that the subject believe
any particular content, such as content about the egocentric location
of particulars.
Belief is fragile with respect to perturbations that leave seeing
intact, so no doxastic state can be necessary for
seeing.12
(A further reason for thinking that a doxastic requirement on object
seeing is too strong involves the possibility of object seeing by
non-human animals and neonate human beings.
For one thing, while many writers have felt uncomfortable attributing
doxastic states to non-human animals and human neonates, they have
generally been less reluctant to claim that such creatures are
incapable of object seeing; but if object seeing requires any doxastic
state, then the latter claim follows from the former.
For another, the question whether all seeing animals are cognizing
animals strikes us as broadly empirical; as such, it strikes us as
inappropriate as a matter of methodology to allow this question to be
settled as a consequence of the requirements on object seeing imposed
from the armchair.)
4 Reliable Egocentric Spatial Information
The moral we have drawn so far is that a successful answer to Walton's
challenge cannot involve a doxastic requirement on object seeing.
On the other hand, we do not believe that photographs are transparent,
and we are sympathetic to the general idea of exploiting egocentric
spatial information to distinguish between genuine and non-genuine
cases of prosthetic seeing.
In this section we shall offer a response of this general form that
does not depend on a doxastic requirement, and therefore that evades
the problems that plague the variants examined so far.
To motivate our response, recall the standard distinction in
epistemology between internalist and externalist accounts of
justification (and knowledge), set out nicely by Bonjour in the
following passage:
... a theory of justification is internalist if and only if
it requires that all of the factors needed for a belief to be
epistemically justified for a given person be cognitively
accessible to that person, internal to his cognitive
perspective; and externalist, if it allows that at least some of
the justifying factors need not be thus accessible, so that they can
be external to the believer's cognitive perspective, beyond
his ken ([Bonjour, 1992], 132, emphasis in original).
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to review the
internalist/externalist controversies about knowledge and
justification, it will be helpful to have in view an example of an
externalist theory, and for this purpose we will rely on what is
perhaps the most prominent form of epistemological externalism: the
reliabilist view proposed in [Goldman, 1976].
To a first approximation, Goldman's version of justification
reliabilism holds that a belief counts as justified if and only if it
is produced by a reliable belief-forming process.
In virtue of what does a belief-forming process count as reliable?
Again, to a first approximation, cognitive processes count as reliable
to the extent that they tend to produce true beliefs (where the latter
tendency is understood as involving all the beliefs that a process is
disposed to produce, and not simply those it actually produces).
On this view, then, justified beliefs are those produced by reliable
cognitive processes.13
In the context of the problems examined in §3,
an externalist view such as reliabilism seems to be just what we need
to move forward.
We emphasize that it is no part of our brief to argue for a
reliabilist account of justification or knowledge.
However, the idea of a factor external to the subject's cognitive
perspective is of utmost importance in solving the problem as we
see it.
Moreover, reliable processes seem to be just the sort of external
factor upon which to focus.
We propose to use the notion of a reliable process to formulate a
non-doxastic requirement on object seeing.
We believe that this will enable us to draw the desired distinction
between ordinary and prosthetic seeing on the one hand, and
photography on the other.
Here, then, is our proposed answer to Walton's challenge.
We propose that knowledge about the egocentric spatial location of an
object is not a necessary condition for seeing it, but instead that
what is essential is that the relevant visual experience is produced
by a process that is also a reliable source of egocentric spatial
information about the object.
That is, x sees y through a visual process z only if z is a
reliable source of information about the egocentric location of y
with respect to x.
According to us, mirrors are transparent in Walton's sense because
mirrors are reliable sources of egocentric spatial information about
objects.
In contrast, our view secures the desired conclusion that photography
is not transparent, insofar as photographs are not reliable sources of
egocentric spatial information about their depicta.
Some comments are in order.
- We are not claiming that the provision of reliable information
about egocentric location of perceived objects is sufficient for
seeing.
Clearly it is not, and our account reflects this.
- Our view does not entail that x sees y only if x
actually possesses accurate information about the egocentric location
of y.
We take it that object seeing can occur in conditions in which the
information about the distance and position of the relevant
object is far from accurate.
Our account only requires that the process by which the egocentric
information is obtained is a reliable one.
We follow standard practice in epistemology in holding that
reliability should be understood dispositionally; this allows
that reliable processes may fail, in individual cases, to produce
accurate information.
- Our account does not place a doxastic requirement on seeing.
We hold that what is essential to seeing is that the relevant visual
experience is produced by a process that is also a reliable source of
egocentric spatial information about the perceived object.
On our account, knowledge - or even mere belief - about the
location of the object is not necessary for seeing.
For the activity of reliable processes need not result in beliefs (for
example, such processes may be at work in the case of the
thoroughgoing skeptic, although in her case they would fail to result
in beliefs; this is in accord with our insistence in
§3 that the onset of skeptical doubt should not
erode the capacity for object seeing).
For this reason, our account evades the problems pressed against other
answers to Walton in §3.
To see that our proposal is extensionally correct, let us examine a
few cases.
We begin by looking at some cases where it is clear that we do see.
We take it is as fairly obvious that our view allows for ordinary
(non-prosthetic) seeing and uncontroversial cases of seeing by visual
prostheses.
Ordinary seeing is a reliable source of information about the
egocentric location of objects.
It does not get things right all the time (sometimes, for example, we
misjudge egocentric distances of seen objects), but this is not a
problem for our proposal, as we have made it explicit that the notion
of reliability must be understood dispositionally.
In addition, our proposal allows for uncontroversial cases of
prosthetic vision involving eyeglasses, binoculars, telescopes, and
periscopes.
All of these prostheses are reliable sources of egocentric information
(although they may fail in certain circumstances).14
For the same reason, our view allows for seeing through a single
mirror.
Moreover, the condition we propose creates no problem for saying that
I see in the case in which I am surrounded by many mirrors (or merely
suspect that I am).
Although this situation might undercut my belief that I am seeing, and
hence my ability to know that I see, this cannot undercut the
reliability of the mirror with respect to egocentric
information.
What about cases in which we do not see?
Our proposal clearly precludes seeing in the case of photography,
film, and video.
While these visual processes are reliable sources of some sorts of
information, they are not reliable sources of egocentric spatial
information.
This is true even if they occasionally do provide such information,
for it is the lack of a disposition to provide such information that
precludes these processes from underwriting seeing.
What about painting and drawing done in realist (or even
photo-realist) style?
Consider cases in which a painter strives to depict an actual person
or scene accurately.
In these cases, counterfactual dependence and the preservation of real
similarity relations may be present.
In addition, such paintings may be reliable sources of a great deal of
information about their subjects.
But these painting (like photographs) fail to be reliable sources of
egocentric information about the objects they depict.
Hence, seeing is precluded (as desired).15
References
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Alston, W. P. (1995).
How to think about reliability.
Philosophical Topics, 23(1):1-29.
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Bazin, A. (1967).
What Is Cinema?
University of California Press, Berkeley.
Translated by Hugh Gray.
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externalism/internalism.
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Epistemology, pages 132-136. Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
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Carroll, N. (1995).
Towards an ontology of the moving image.
In Freeland, C. A. and Wartenberg, T. E., editors, Philosophy
and Film. Routledge, New York.
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Theorizing the Moving Image.
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The generality problem for reliabilism.
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Feldman, R. (1985).
Reliability and justification.
The Monist, 68:159-174.
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Goldman, A. I. (1976).
What is justified belief?
In Pappas, G. S., editor, Justification and Knowledge. Reidel,
Dordrecht.
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Lewis, D. (1980).
Veridical hallucination and prosthetic vision.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 58:239-249.
Reprinted in [Lewis, 1986], 273-286.
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Lewis, D. (1986).
Philosophical Papers, Volume II.
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Obrist, H.-U., editor (1995).
Gerhard Richter: The Daily Practice of Painting: Writings and
Interviews 1962-1993.
MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
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Walton, K. (1984).
Transparent pictures: On the nature of photographic realism.
Critical Inquiry, 11:246-276.
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Walton, K. (1997).
On pictures and photographs: Objections answered.
In Allen, R. and Smith, M., editors, Film Theory and
Philosophy, pages 60-75. Oxford University Press.
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Warburton, N. (1988).
Seeing through "Seeing through Photographs".
Ratio, NS 1:64-74.
Footnotes:
1This work is fully
collaborative; the authors are listed alphabetically.
2Department of Philosophy, University of
California, San Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, CA 92093-0119,
joncohenREMOVETHIS@aardvark.ucsd.edu (omit text in caps, which reduces
automated spam)
3Department of
Philosophy, Texas Tech University, Box 43092, Lubbock, TX 79409,
aaron.meskin@ttu.edu
4Cinematographic and video depictions also count as
transparent on Walton's account.
The contrast he draws is primarily with painting and drawing.
Our focus of discussion in what follows will be the status of
photographs.
5He does
not claim that the depictum is the only thing we see; and, in
particular, he does not deny that we see the photograph in addition to
its depictum.
Indeed, he insists that it is in virtue of seeing the photograph that
we see its depictum.
Hence, on this view, transparency does not entail invisibility.
6Note that
photographs are not unique among these visual prostheses in allowing
for a specifically temporal separation between viewer and the object
seen: we speak unhesitatingly of seeing a stellar explosion through
a telescope, even if the explosion transpired millions of years before
the viewer existed.
7We suspect even Walton would concede this
much - this would explain why he felt the need to warn against
taking the thesis non-literally.
8Some articulations of this point (e.g., that in
[Currie, 1995], 66) put the point in terms of
spatio-temporal relation.
We prefer to express the point in terms of spatial relations
in the context of an attempt to exclude photographs because, arguably,
when x looks at time t at a photograph of y, x (or x's
visual system) represents the information that y existed before time
t.
We don't see any non-stipulative reason for refusing to count this as
information about the spatio-temporal relation between the viewer and
the depictum, but it doesn't seem reasonable to count it as
information about the spatial relation between the viewer and the
depictum.
9Currie and
Carroll claim that the spatial requirement in question is a necessary
condition for prosthetic seeing, not that it is a sufficient
condition.
This is all to the good, since it is not a sufficient condition: if I
am looking straight down at my desk, wearing blinders, and you hand me
written descriptions of the spatial relations that obtain between me
and objects in my vicinity, then I may know where these objects are in
relation to me, but presumably I am not (or not literally) seeing
these objects prosthetically (using you as my prosthetic).
10We can imagine a defender of the
egocentric information requirement who would allow that, after the
number of intervening mirrors between the subject and the carnation
gets sufficiently large - say, greater than n, the subject ceases
to see the carnation.
Therefore, she might suggest, the case involving n+1 mirrors is not
a case where the subject sees without egocentric spatial information,
hence not a counterexample to the requirement she is defending.
But we find this response unconvincing.
For as Walton's second case shows, the point does not turn on
assuming large numbers of mirrors are involved.
Therefore, the point goes through even if we concede the objection.
11The intuitions
about Walton's specific cases adduced here are certainly not beyond
dispute - especially if the doxastic requirement under discussion is
weakened in the way imagined at the end of §2.
But the general moral we are drawing stands, independently of verdicts
about these specific cases: mere confusion can undermine belief
but cannot undermine seeing.
12Arguably there is a non-doxastic reading of at least
Carroll's version of the spatio-temporal information proposal.
For, at times, Carroll seems to be suggesting that the relevant
difference between ordinary seeing and photographic looking has to do
with their relation to our physical abilities:
I can `orient my body' spatially to what I see, either with the naked
eye or through a telescope or microscope.
But when I see a photograph I cannot orient my body to the
photographed objects.
The space of the objects is `disconnected phenomenologically from the
space I live in' ([Carroll, 1995], 71).
If the `orientability requirement' Carroll suggests here is understood
as not placing doxastic requirements on would-be seers, then it would
evade the problem we have been discussing.
However, this requirement, too, seems too strong, since it would
inappropriately follow from the requirement that organisms incapable
of moving their bodies (e.g., normal human victims of paralysis)
cannot see any objects.
13Of course, reliabilist accounts of
knowledge and justification are not free from controversy.
However, it is worth noting that many of the more serious problems
pressed against reliabilism - namely, complaints to the effect that
reliability is by itself unnecessary or insufficient to explain
justification or knowledge - don't affect our proposal.
We are not defending a reliabilist (or any other) theory of
justification or knowledge, but only helping ourselves to the idea of
reliable processes in the service of a proposal about object seeing.
Among the anti-reliabilism complaints that our view does not evade, we
believe the most serious is the so-called Generality Problem - i.e.,
the problem of how finely or coarsely to individuate process-types
(see [Feldman, 1985], [Alston, 1995], [Conee and Feldman, 1998]).
We cannot hope to solve the Generality Problem here.
14Indeed, it
is critical to the standard use of these tools that they are reliable
sources of egocentric information.
Consider, for example, binoculars and periscopes: we don't simply want
to find out what the enemy soldier and enemy battleship look like, we
want reliable information about where they are in relation to us.
15We are grateful to
Ram Neta and Rob Rupert for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
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