Here is my curriculum vitae.
Red and The Real: An Essay on Color Ontology. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009.
- In this monograph I bring together and extend many of the themes
and ideas I have been pursuing in article form for the past several
years about the nature of color. In particular, the book is an
extended elaboration and defense of color relationalism and role
functionalism about color.
APA Book Prize]
Pautz (Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews);
Maund (Australasian Journal of Philosophy);
M. Brynjarsdóttir (Metapsychology Online Reviews);
Sarah Allred (Perception);
Allen (European Journal of Philosophy)]
Ontology and Color Science (co-edited
Matthen). Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2010.
- This anthology of philosophical and scientific papers on color
grew out of a pair of interdisciplinary conferences on color held at
UCSD in October 2002 and the University of British Columbia in
in the Philosophy of Mind (co-edited with
McLaughlin). New York: Blackwell, 2007.
- This volume of newly commissioned essays presents debates on
fundamental issues by leading figures in philosophy of mind.
(These are all penultimate versions; for the
final versions, see the journals in which they're published.)
- "Chromatic layering and
color relationalism". Minds and Machines
26(3): 287-301, 2016.
comparability, and color, or: How to have your cake and eat it,
too" Minds and Machines (special issue on color), 25(2):
- "Review of
M. Chirimuuta, Outside Color: Perceptual Science and the Puzzle
of Color in Philosophy" Notre Dame Philosophical
and Realer: Responses to Egan and Tye", Analytic
Philosophy 53(3): 313-326, 2012. (For a symposium on The
Red and The Real: An Essay on Color Ontology.)
of The Red and the Real: An Essay on Color Ontology",
Analytic Philosophy 53(3): 288-296, 2012. (For a
Red and The Real: An Essay on Color Ontology.)
- "Redness, Reality, and
Relationalism: Reply to Gert and Allen" The Croatian
Journal of Philosophy (special issue on color and perception)
12(36): 351-378, 2012.
Relationalism and Color Phenomenology", in Perceiving the
World, edited by Bence Nanay, 13-32. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2010.
- "Colors, Color
Relationalism, and The Deliverances of
Introspection" (with Shaun Nichols),
Analysis, 70(2): 218-228, 2010.
- "Introduction" (with Mohan
Matthen), in Color Ontology and Color Science, edited
by Cohen and Matthen, ix-xxiii. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press,
- "It's Not Easy Being Green: Hardin and
Color Relationalism", in Color Ontology and Color
Science, edited by Cohen and Matthen, 229-244. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2010.
- "Color" in The Routledge
Companion to Philosophy of Psychology, edited by John Symons
and Paco Calvo, 568-578. New York: Routledge, 2009.
- "Color Constancy as
Counterfactual", Australasian Journal of Philosophy,
86(1): 61-92, 2008. (Color figures for this paper, which did not
make it into the printed version in the journal, are
- "A Relationalist's Guide to Errors About
Color Perception", Noûs, 41(2): 335-353,
Truth about `The Truth about True Blue'" (with C. L. Hardin
67(294): 162-166, 2007.
- "Color, Variation, and the Appeal to
Essences: Impasse and Resolution", Philosophical
Studies, 133(3): 425-438, 2007.
Colors" (with C. L. Hardin
McLaughlin), Analysis, 66(292): 335-340, 2006.
- "Color and Perceptual
Variation Revisited: Unknown Facts, Alien Modalities, and Perfect
Psychosemantics", Dialectica, 60(3): 307-319,
- "Colors, Functions, Realizers,
and Roles", Philosophical Topics, 33(1):117-140,
- "Color Properties and Color
Ascriptions: A Relationalist Manifesto", The Philosophical
Review, 113(4): 451-506, 2004.
- "Color: A Functionalist
Proposal", Philosophical Studies 113(1): 1-42,
- "Critical Study of Stroud's The
Quest for Reality", Noûs, 37(3): 537-554,
- "On The Structural Properties
of the Colors", Australasian Journal of Philosophy,
81(1): 78-95, 2003.
- "Perceptual Variation, Realism, and
Relativization, Or: How I Learned To Stop Worrying And Love
Variations In Color Vision (Open peer commentary on Byrne and
Hilbert, `Color Realism and Color Science')", Behavioral
and Brain Sciences, 26(1): 25-26, 2003.
- "A Guided Tour of Color",
Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, edited by M. Nani
and M. Marraffa, 2001.
- "Color, Content, and Fred: On a Proposed Reductio of the Inverted
Spectrum Hypothesis", Philosophical Studies, 103: 121-144,
- "Subjectivism, Physicalism, or
None of the Above?: Comments on Ross's `The Location Problem for
Color Subjectivism'", Consciousness and Cognition,
10(1): 94-104, 2001.
- "Two Recent Anthologies on
Color", Philosophical Psychology, 14(1): 118-122,
- "Why Asymmetries in Color Space Can't Save Functionalism (open
peer Commentary on Palmer's `Color, Consciousness, and The
Isomorphism Constraint')," Behavioral and Brain Sciences
22(6): 950, 1999.
- "Synesthetic Perception as
Continuous With Ordinary Perception, or: We're All Synesthetes
Now" in Sensory
blendings: New essays on synaesthesia and related phenomena,
edited by Ophelia Deroy. New York: Oxford University Press,
- "Perceptual Integration,
Modularity, and Cognitive Penetration"
Burnston) in The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: New
Philosophical Perspectives, edited by John Zeimbekis and
Athanassios Raftopoulos, 123-143. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
Constancy" in The Oxford Handbook
of Philosophy of Perception, edited by Mohan Matthen,
621-639. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
- "Perceptual representation,
veridicality, and the interface theory of perception",
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 22(6): 1512-1518,
- "On the
limitations of blind
tasting," World of Fine
Wine 41: 74-81, September 2013.
of Features and Perception of Objects" (with Dan
Burnston), The Croatian Journal of Philosophy (special issue
on color and perception) 12(36): 283-314, 2012.
- "Computation and
the Ambiguity of Perception"
Experience: Sensation, Cognition and Constancy, edited by Gary
Hatfield and Sarah Allred, 160-176. New York: Oxford University
- "Perception and
Computation", Philosophical Issues 20(1): 96-124,
- "Sounds and
Temporality" Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 5:
- "Objects, Places, and
Perception", Philosophical Psychology, 17(4):
- "The Grand Grand
Illusion Illusion", Journal of Consciousness Studies,
9(5-6): 141-157, 2002.
- "Whither Visual Representations? Whither Qualia? (Open peer
commentary on O'Regan and Noe, `A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and
Visual Consciousness')," Behavioral and Brain Sciences,
24(5): 980-981, 2001
- "Indexicality and the
Puzzle of the Answering Machine", Journal of
Philosophy 110(1): 5-32, 2013.
- "Indexicality and
The Answering Machine Paradox" (with Eliot Michaelson),
Philosophy Compass 8(6): 580-592, 2013.
- "On Collection and Covert
Variables" (with Ivano
Caponigro), Analysis, 71(3): 478-488, 2011.
- "Binding Arguments
and Hidden Variables" (with Sam
Rickless), Analysis, 67(293): 65-71, 2007.
- "Analyticity and Katz's New
Intensionalism: or, If You Sever Sense from Reference, Analyticity
is Cheap But Useless", Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 61(1): 115-135, 2000.
- "The Reality of Psychological Reality: Chomsky and Matthews's
Chomsky" (contribution to
Project in celebration of Noam Chomsky's 70th birthday).
Rationalization, and Motivation" (with Matthew
Fulkerson), The Review of Philosophy and
Psychology (special issue on pain and pleasure), 5(1): 103-118,
- "Introduction". In Contemporary
Debates in the Philosophy of Mind, edited by Cohen and
McLaughlin. New York: Blackwell, 2007.
- "Information and
Content". In Blackwell
Guide to the Philosophy of Information and Computing,
edited by Luciano Floridi, 215-227. New York: Blackwell,
- "Williamson on Knowledge and
Psychological Explanation" (with P. D. Magnus),
Philosophical Studies, 116(1): 37-52, 2003.
- "Holism: Some Reasons for Buyer's Remorse," Analysis,
59(2): 63-71, 1999.
- "Holism, Thought, and the Fate of Metaphysics: Counter-reply to
Heal," Analysis, 59(2): 79-85, 1999.
- "Frege and Psychologism", Philosophical Papers, 27(1):
- "The Imagery Debate: A Critical Assessment", Journal of
Philosophical Research, 21: 149-182, 1996.
Sciences, Conspiracy, and the Better Best System Account of
Lawhood" (with Craig
Callender), Erkenntnis 73: 427-447, 2010.
- "A Better
Best System Account of Lawhood" (with Craig
Callender), Philosophical Studies, 145(1):1-34,
Probabilities, and Information: Response to
Critics" (with Aaron
Meskin), Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 86(4):
- "An Objective
Counterfactual Theory of Information" (with Aaron
Meskin), Australasian Journal of Philosophy,
- "There is No
Special Problem About Scientific
Representation" (with Craig
Callender) , Theoria, 55: 67-85, 2006 (special
issue on scientific representation).
- "On An Alleged
Non-Equivalence Between Dispositions And Disjunctive
Properties", British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science, 53(1): 77-81, 2002.
Drafts In Progress
(Papers I am working on, or will be working on, or should be working on.
These are drafts, so the usual drill applies: please do
not cite them without permission, but feel free to give me pages and
pages of useful feedback.)
- "Pain and Rationality"
Fulkerson) surveys some of the most important connections
between pain and our rational lives, highlighting pain's capacity
to provide the subjects in whom it occurs with practially
motivating reasons and rationally justifying reasons.
This is headed for the forthcoming Routledge Handbook of
Philosophy of Pain (Jennifer Corns, ed.).
- "Sensory Substitution
and Perceptual Emergence"
is a discussion of sensory substitution systems -- prosthetic
by which information normally represented by one perceptual modality
(say, vision) is instead represented by an alternative
channel involving a second modality (say, touch or audition).
I argue that such devices, which are ordinarily constructed to
preserve the representation of low-level energy available to the
substituted sense modality, will not automatically capture the full
range of properties normally represented by that modality.
This doesn't show that sensory substitution devices will inevitably
fail to capture the representational scope of the modalities they
are intended to replace; but it shows that if they succeed in this
task, their doing so involves more than simply preserving the
representation of the energy available to the substituted modality.
- "Wine Tasting, Blind and
Otherwise: Blindness as a Perceptual Limitation" argues against
treating blind tasting as the One True Way of experiencing wine (as
it is in fact treated by many writers in the wine world).
- "The Agony of Reason: The Unsteady
Bond Between Suffering and Human Rationality"
Fulkerson) argues that, though pain and other forms of
suffering plausibly confer practical reasons and so becomes
integrated in central and important ways with practical rationality
in creatures like us, there are nonetheless significant limits to
Namely, suffering continues to behave in ways that distinguish it
from other objects of rationality, and make it appear more like (yet
nonetheless distinct from) a kind of non-rational influence.
In this sense, suffering seems to play a dual -- partly rational,
partly arational -- role in the mental lives of creatures like us
that it does not in the mental lives of psychologically less or more
rationally sophisticated creatures.
Relationalism" is an attempt to explain, motivate, and defend
color relationalism in an especially brief format.
Intended for the forthcoming Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of
Colour (Derek Brown and Fiona Macpherson, ed.).