Here is my curriculum vitae.

Books

The Red and The Real: An Essay on Color Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

In this monograph I bring together and extend many of the themes and ideas I have been pursuing in article form for the past several years about the nature of color. In particular, the book is an extended elaboration and defense of color relationalism and role functionalism about color.
[google books] [oup, uk] [oup, usa] [amazon] [Honorable mention, 2011 APA Book Prize] [reviews: Adam Pautz (Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews); Barry Maund (Australasian Journal of Philosophy); Eyja M. Brynjarsdóttir (Metapsychology Online Reviews); Sarah Allred (Perception); Keith Allen (European Journal of Philosophy)]

Color Ontology and Color Science (co-edited with Mohan Matthen). Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2010.

This anthology of philosophical and scientific papers on color grew out of a pair of interdisciplinary conferences on color held at UCSD in October 2002 and the University of British Columbia in October 2003.
[google books] [MIT Press] [amazon]

Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind (co-edited with Brian McLaughlin). New York: Blackwell, 2007, 2023.

This volume of newly commissioned essays presents debates on fundamental issues by leading figures in philosophy of mind.
[google books] [wiley-blackwell] [amazon]

Papers

On color

• "Daylight savings: What an answer to the perceptual variation problem cannot be," (with Eliot Michaelson), Philosophical Studies 178(3):833-843, 2021.
• "Color Relationalism" in Derek Brown and Fiona Macpherson (ed.), 311-326, Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour Routledge, 2020.
• "Chromatic layering and color relationalism". Minds and Machines 26(3): 287-301, 2016.
• "Ecumenicism, comparability, and color, or: How to have your cake and eat it, too" Minds and Machines (special issue on color), 25(2): 149-175, 2015.
• "Review of M. Chirimuuta, Outside Color: Perceptual Science and the Puzzle of Color in Philosophy" Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2015.
• "Redder and Realer: Responses to Egan and Tye", Analytic Philosophy 53(3): 313-326, 2012. (For a symposium on The Red and The Real: An Essay on Color Ontology.)
• "Precis of The Red and the Real: An Essay on Color Ontology", Analytic Philosophy 53(3): 288-296, 2012. (For a symposium on The Red and The Real: An Essay on Color Ontology.)
• "Redness, Reality, and Relationalism: Reply to Gert and Allen" The Croatian Journal of Philosophy (special issue on color and perception) 12(36): 351-378, 2012.
• "Color Relationalism and Color Phenomenology", in Perceiving the World, edited by Bence Nanay, 13-32. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.
• "Colors, Color Relationalism, and The Deliverances of Introspection" (with Shaun Nichols), Analysis, 70(2): 218-228, 2010.
• "Introduction" (with Mohan Matthen), in Color Ontology and Color Science, edited by Cohen and Matthen, ix-xxiii. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2010.
  
• "It's Not Easy Being Green: Hardin and Color Relationalism", in Color Ontology and Color Science, edited by Cohen and Matthen, 229-244. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2010.
  
• "Color" in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology, edited by John Symons and Paco Calvo, 568-578. New York: Routledge, 2009.
• "Color Constancy as Counterfactual", Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 86(1): 61-92, 2008. (Color figures for this paper, which did not make it into the printed version in the journal, are available here.)
• "A Relationalist's Guide to Errors About Color Perception", Noûs, 41(2): 335-353, 2007.
• "The Truth about `The Truth about True Blue'" (with C. L. Hardin and Brian McLaughlin), Analysis 67(294): 162-166, 2007.
• "Color, Variation, and the Appeal to Essences: Impasse and Resolution", Philosophical Studies, 133(3): 425-438, 2007.
• "True Colors" (with C. L. Hardin and Brian McLaughlin), Analysis, 66(292): 335-340, 2006.
• "Color and Perceptual Variation Revisited: Unknown Facts, Alien Modalities, and Perfect Psychosemantics", Dialectica, 60(3): 307-319, 2006.
• "Colors, Functions, Realizers, and Roles", Philosophical Topics, 33(1):117-140, 2005.
• "Color Properties and Color Ascriptions: A Relationalist Manifesto", The Philosophical Review, 113(4): 451-506, 2004.
• "Color: A Functionalist Proposal", Philosophical Studies 113(1): 1-42, 2003.
• "Critical Study of Stroud's The Quest for Reality", Noûs, 37(3): 537-554, 2003.
• "On The Structural Properties of the Colors", Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81(1): 78-95, 2003.
• "Perceptual Variation, Realism, and Relativization, Or: How I Learned To Stop Worrying And Love Variations In Color Vision (Open peer commentary on Byrne and Hilbert, `Color Realism and Color Science')", Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 26(1): 25-26, 2003.
• "A Guided Tour of Color", for A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, edited by M. Nani and M. Marraffa, 2001.
• "Color, Content, and Fred: On a Proposed Reductio of the Inverted Spectrum Hypothesis", Philosophical Studies, 103: 121-144, 2001.
• "Subjectivism, Physicalism, or None of the Above?: Comments on Ross's `The Location Problem for Color Subjectivism'", Consciousness and Cognition, 10(1): 94-104, 2001.
• "Two Recent Anthologies on Color", Philosophical Psychology, 14(1): 118-122, 2001.
• "Why Asymmetries in Color Space Can't Save Functionalism (open peer Commentary on Palmer's `Color, Consciousness, and The Isomorphism Constraint')," Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22(6): 950, 1999.

On perception

• "Advances in the Study of Visual and Multisensory Objects" (with Aleksandra Mroczko-Wąsowicz, Casey O'Callaghan, Brian J. Scholl, and Phillip J. Kellman), in Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, 2023.
• "Multimodal binding as mereological co-constiuency" in Aleksandra Mroczko-Wasowicz and Rick Grush (ed.), Sensory Individuals, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2023.
"What was Molyneux's Question a Question About?" (with Mohan Matthen), in Gabriele Ferretti and Brian Glenney (ed.), Molyneux's Question and the History of Philosophy, 325-344. New York: Routledge, 2021.
• "Many Molyneux Questions" (with Mohan Matthen), Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 98(1):47-63, 2020.
• "Schellenberg on perceptual capacities", Analysis, 79(4): 720–730, 2019.
• "Sensory substitution and perceptual emergence" in Sensory Substitution and Augmentation, edited by Fiona Macpherson, 205-235. Oxford: Proceedings of the British Academy, 2018.
• "Synesthetic Perception as Continuous With Ordinary Perception, or: We're All Synesthetes Now" in Sensory blendings: On synaesthesia and related phenomena, edited by Ophelia Deroy, 59-83. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017.
• "Perceptual Integration, Modularity, and Cognitive Penetration" (with Dan Burnston) in The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives, edited by John Zeimbekis and Athanassios Raftopoulos, 123-143. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
• "Perceptual Constancy" in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception, edited by Mohan Matthen, 621-639. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
• "Perceptual representation, veridicality, and the interface theory of perception", Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 22(6): 1512-1518, 2015.
• "On the limitations of blind tasting," World of Fine Wine 41: 74-81, September 2013.
• "Perception of Features and Perception of Objects" (with Dan Burnston), The Croatian Journal of Philosophy (special issue on color and perception) 12(36): 283-314, 2012.
• "Computation and the Ambiguity of Perception" in Visual Experience: Sensation, Cognition and Constancy, edited by Gary Hatfield and Sarah Allred, 160-176. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.
• "Perception and Computation", Philosophical Issues 20(1): 96-124, 2010.
• "Sounds and Temporality" Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 5: 303-320, 2010.
• "Objects, Places, and Perception", Philosophical Psychology, 17(4): 471-495, 2004.
• "The Grand Grand Illusion Illusion", Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9(5-6): 141-157, 2002.
• "Whither Visual Representations? Whither Qualia? (Open peer commentary on O'Regan and Noe, `A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness')," Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24(5): 980-981, 2001

On language

• "Coherence and coherence establishment: Lessons from eliciture" (with Andrew Kehler), in Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Discourse and Coherence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, in press.
• "Conversational eliciture" (with Andrew Kehler) Philosophers' Imprint, 21(12): 1-26, 2021.
• "On convention and coherence" (with Andrew Kehler) in Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Beyond Semantics and Pragmatics, 261-283. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
• "On the presuppositional behavior of coherence-driven pragmatic enrichments" (with Andrew Kehler), Semantics and Linguistic Theory, 26: 961-979, 2016.
• "Indexicality and the Puzzle of the Answering Machine", Journal of Philosophy 110(1): 5-32, 2013.
• "Indexicality and The Answering Machine Paradox" (with Eliot Michaelson), Philosophy Compass 8(6): 580-592, 2013.
• "On Collection and Covert Variables" (with Ivano Caponigro), Analysis, 71(3): 478-488, 2011.
• "Binding Arguments and Hidden Variables" (with Sam Rickless), Analysis, 67(293): 65-71, 2007.
• "Analyticity and Katz's New Intensionalism: or, If You Sever Sense from Reference, Analyticity is Cheap But Useless", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61(1): 115-135, 2000.

On mind

• "The Agony of Reason: The Unsteady Bond Between Suffering and Human Rationality" (with Matthew Fulkerson), Philosophy of Suffering: Metaphysics, Value, and Normativity, edited by David Bain, Michael Brady, and Jennifer Corns, 251-277. New York: Routledge, 2020.
• "Pain and Rationality" (with Matthew Fulkerson), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain, edited by Jennifer Corns, 235-244. New York: Routledge, 2017.
• "Affect, Rationalization, and Motivation" (with Matthew Fulkerson), The Review of Philosophy and Psychology (special issue on pain and pleasure), 5(1): 103-118, 2014.
• "Introduction". In Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind, edited by Cohen and McLaughlin. New York: Blackwell, 2007.
• "Information and Content". In Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Information and Computing, edited by Luciano Floridi, 215-227. New York: Blackwell, 2004.
• "Williamson on Knowledge and Psychological Explanation" (with P. D. Magnus), Philosophical Studies, 116(1): 37-52, 2003.
• "Holism: Some Reasons for Buyer's Remorse," Analysis, 59(2): 63-71, 1999.
• "Holism, Thought, and the Fate of Metaphysics: Counter-reply to Heal," Analysis, 59(2): 79-85, 1999.
• "Frege and Psychologism", Philosophical Papers, 27(1): 45-67, 1998.
• "The Imagery Debate: A Critical Assessment", Journal of Philosophical Research, 21: 149-182, 1996.

On science

• "Interpolating decisions" (with Elliott Sober), Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101(2): 327--339, 2023.
• "Special Sciences, Conspiracy, and the Better Best System Account of Lawhood" (with Craig Callender), Erkenntnis 73: 427-447, 2010.
• "A Better Best System Account of Lawhood" (with Craig Callender), Philosophical Studies, 145(1):1-34, 2009.
• "Counterfactuals, Probabilities, and Information: Response to Critics" (with Aaron Meskin), Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 86(4): 635-642, 2008.
• "An Objective Counterfactual Theory of Information" (with Aaron Meskin), Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 84(3):333-352, 2006.
• "There is No Special Problem About Scientific Representation" (with Craig Callender) , Theoria, 55: 67-85, 2006 (special issue on scientific representation).
• "On An Alleged Non-Equivalence Between Dispositions And Disjunctive Properties", British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 53(1): 77-81, 2002.

On aesthetics

• "Photography and Its Epistemic Values: Reply to Cavedon-Taylor" (with Aaron Meskin), Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 67(2): 235-237, 2009.
• "Photographs as Evidence" (with Aaron Meskin). In Photography and Philosophy: Essays on the Pencil of Nature, edited by Scott Walden, 70-90. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008.
• "On The Epistemic Value of Photographs" (with Aaron Meskin), Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 62(2): 197-210, 2004.

Drafts In Progress

• "Wine Tasting, Blind and Otherwise: Blindness as a Perceptual Limitation" argues against treating blind tasting as the One True Way of experiencing wine (as it is in fact treated by many writers in the wine world).
• "On locational sensory individuals and spacetime" argues against construing sensory individuals as spatial locations or regions on the ground that these views are unable to makes sense of the perceptual representation of sensory indivduals as moving and occupying locations in spacetime.